Essay Questions
Readings:
- Burge, T. (1988): Individualism and Self Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy, 85.
- Boghossian, P. A., (1997): What Can the Externalist Know A Priori?, Philosophical Issues: Concepts, 9: 197-211, 1988.
- Boghossian, P. A., (1988): Replies to Commentators, Philosophical Issues: Concepts, 9: pp. 253-60.
- Brown, J., (1999): Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access, Analysis, 59: pp. 52-9.
- Brown, J., (2001): Anti-Individualism and Agnosticism, Analysis, 61: 213-214.
- Corbi, J. E., (1988): A Challenge to Boghossian's Incompatibilist Argument, Philosophical Studies: Concepts, 9, pp. 231, 42.
- Falvey, K., (2000): The Compatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access, Analysis, 60: pp. 137-42.
- Goldberg, S. C., (2003): Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism, Philosophical Studies, 116: pp. 53-78.
- Loar, B., (1998): Is There a Good Epistemological Argument Against Concept-Externalism?, Philosophical Issues, Concepts, 9, pp. 213-17.
- McKinsey, M., (1991): Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access, Analysis, 51: pp. 9-16.
- Moya, C. J., (1998): Philosophical Issues, Concepts, 9: pp. 243-51.
- Nuccetelli, S., (1999): What Anti-Individualists Cannot Know A Priori, Analysis, 59, pp. 48-51.
- Yablo, S., (1998): Self-Knowledge and Semantic Luck, Philosophical Issues, Concepts, 9: pp. 219-229.
Readings:
- Block, N., Flanagan, O, and Yzeldere, G. (1997): The Nature of Consciousness, MIT Press.
- Crick, F. and Koch, C. (1990) Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness, in Seminars on the Neurosciences, 2, pp. 200-19.
- Nagel, T. (1974): What is it like to be a Bat, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge, (1979).
- Dennet, D. (1991): Consciousness Explained. penguin science.
- Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind, oxford uni press.
Readings:
- Armstrong, D., (1973): Belief Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press.
- Dretske, F., (1969): Seeing and Knowing, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Dretske, F. (1981): Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
- Evans, G., (1982): The Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Fodor, J. A., (1983): Observation Reconsidered, in J. A. Fodor (ed.) A Theory of Content and Other Essays, pp. 231-51, MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. A., (2004): The Revenge of the Given
- Gunther, Y. H., (2003): Essays on Non-Conceptual Content, MIT Press.
- McDowell, J., (1994): Mind and World, Harvard University Press.
- Peacocke, C., (1986): Analogue Content, in R. Schwartz (ed.): Perception, pp. 306-20, Blackwell, 2004.
- Peacocke, C., (2001): Does Perception Have Non-Conceptual Content, Journal of Philosophy, 98.
- Peacocke, C., (2001): Phenomenology and Non-Conceptual Content, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: pp. 609-15.
- Smith, A. D., (2001): Perception and Belief, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62: pp. 283-309.
Readings:
- Armstrong, D. M., (1968): A Materialist Theory of Mind, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F., (2007): The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 2nd edition [1st edition: 1996], Blackwell.
- Campbell, K. (1970): Body and Mind, Macmillan.
- Churchland, P. (1988): Matter and Consciousness, 2nd edition, MIT Press.
- Horgan, T. (1993): From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Materialist World, Mind, 102, pp. 253-68.
Readings:
- Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F., (2007): The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 2nd edition [1st edition: 1996], Blackwell.
- Campbell, K. (1970): Body and Mind, Macmillan.
- Churchland, P. (1988): Matter and Consciousness, 2nd edition, MIT Press.
- Lewis, D. (1972): Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, pp. 249-58.