Philosophy of Language, teaching
Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson's Homepage
Topics
- What is deflationism about truth? Is it defensible?
- Expound Russell's theory of denoting phrases (definite descriptions). Do you think that it is successful? Why?
- Expound Frege's notions of sinn (sense) and bedeutung (reference/meaning) taking proper names as a an example. How is Frege's distinction supposed to deal with coreference? Do you think it is successful?
- Explicate and assess Quine's attacks on meaning and the analytic/synthetic distinction.
- Assess Donnellan's distinction between the attributive and referential use of definite descriptions.
- What is 'rigid designation'? Expound the notion with explicit reference to Kripke's causal theory of reference. How is the causal theory of reference contrasted with the description theory of reference?
- Are demonstratives directly referential?
- What is the correct analysis of conditionals? Why?
What is deflationism about truth? Is it defensible?
Readings:
- Alston, W. P. (1996): A Realist Conception of Truth, Cornell.
- Blackburn, S., and Simmons, K. (1999): Truth, Oxford.
- Brandom, R. B. (1988): Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XII, Realism, pp. 75-93.
- Brandom, R. B. (2002): Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth, in Schantz, R. (ed.): What is Truth, pp. 103-19, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2002.
- Davidson, D. (1990): The Structure and Content of Truth, Journal of Philosophy, 87: pp. 307-19.
- Devitt, M. (2002): The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth, in Schantz, R. (ed.): What is Truth, pp. 60-78, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2002.
- Field, H. (1993): Deflationist views of Meaning and Content, in Blackburn, S., and Simmons, K. (1999): Truth, pp. 351-92, Oxford.
- Grover, D. L., Camp, J. L., Belnap, N. D., (1975): A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Philosophical Studies, 27: pp. 73-125.
- Gupta, A., (1993): A Critique of Deflationism, in Blackburn, S., and Simmons, K. (1999): Truth, pp. 282-307, Oxford.
- Horwich, P. (1990): Truth, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
- Horwich, P. (1999): The Minimalist Conception of Truth, in Blackburn, S., and Simmons, K. (1999): Truth, pp. 239-263, Oxford.
- Horwich, P. (2002): Norms of Truth and Meaning, in Schantz, R. (ed.): What is Truth, pp. 133-45, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2002.
- Kirkham, R. L., (1992): Theories of truth: A Critical Introduction, The MIT Press.
Expound Russell's theory of denoting phrases (definite descriptions). Do you think that it is successful? Why?
Readings:
- The special issue of Mind: '100 Years on 'On Denoting', volume 114, 456, October 2005 contains Russell's original paper, an excellent introduction by Stephen Neale, and nine papers on the topic by Kripke and Kaplan etc. All of these are relevant.
- If your inside the Oxford network you should be able to access the issue here.
Expound Frege's notions of sinn (sense) and bedeutung (reference/meaning) taking proper names as a an example. How is Frege's distinction supposed to deal with coreference? Do you think it is successful?
Readings:
- Frege, G.
- 'On Sinn and Bedeutung', 'On Concept and Object', 'Thoughts', and 'Compound Thoughts', all of which may be found in Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuiness, tr. M. Black, et. al. Blackwell, (1984).
- Beany, M. (1996): Frege: Making Sense, Duckworth.
- Dummet, M. (1993): Frege: Philosophy of Language, ch. 1 (ch. 2-7 are relevant also), Harvard University Press.
Explicate and assess Quine's attacks on meaning and the analytic/synthetic distinction.
Readings:
- Quine, W. V. O. : 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition, revised, Harvard University Press, (1980).
- Quine, W. V. O. (1960): Word and Object, ch. 2, MIT Press.
- Quine, W. V. O. : 'Ontological Relativity, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, 1969.
- Quine, W. V. O. (1990): The Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press.
- Horwich, P. (2000): 'On the Existence of Meanings', in Knowledge, Language, and Logic, Kluwer, (2000).
- McDermott, M. (2001): 'Quine's Holism and Functional Holism, Mind, 110, 440. If you're inside the Oxford network, you should be able to access this here
- Katz, J. J. (1990): 'The Domino Theory', Philosophical Studies, 58.
Assess Donnellan's distinction between the attributive and referential use of definite descriptions.
Readings:
- Donnellan, K. S., (1966): Reference and Definite Descriptions, Philosophical Review, 75: 281-304.
- Kripke, S., (1979): Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference, in Ostertag, G. (ed.) Definite Descriptions: A Reader, 1998, MIT Press.
- Neale, S., (1990): Descriptions, MIT Press.
What is 'rigid designation'? Expound the notion with explicit reference to Kripke's causal theory of reference. How is the causal theory of reference contrasted with the description theory of reference?
Readings:
- Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Blackwell.
Are demonstratives directly referential?
Readings:
- Bach, K., (1992): Paving the Road to Reference, Philosophical Studies, 67: 295-300.
- Kaplan, D., (1989): Demonstratives (and Afterthoughts), in J. Almog, et. al. (eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press (1989).
- Perry, J., (1977): Frege on Demonstratives, Philosophical Review, 86: 474-97.
- Reimer, M., (1991): Do Demonstratives Have Semantic Significance, Analysis, 51: 177-83.
What is the correct analysis of conditionals? Why?
Readings:
- Mares, E. (2004): Relevant Logic, Cambridge.
- Bennet, J. (2003): A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford University Press.
- Edgington, D., (1995): On Conditionals, Mind, 104, pp. 235-329.
- Evans, J., and Over, D., (2004): If, Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, F. (ed.) (1991): Conditionals, Oxford University Press, [an anthology, start with the introduction, and then choose wisely from within].
- McDermott, M. (1996): On the Truth Conditions of Certain 'If'-Sentences, Philosophical Review, 98, pp. 485, 542.
- Sanford, D., (2003): If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning, Routledge.
Contact details
email seb: sequoiah {at} gmail.com
email inky: inkythewhiteboardmarker {at} gmail.com
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