Philosophy of Science, Teaching
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Essay Questions
- What is the best account of scientific explanation? Why?
- Compare Humean, sufficiency, necessity, and probabilistic accounts of causation. Which, if any, is best? Why?
- What is the best account of Inference to the Best Explanation?
- What is the best account of scientific progress? Why?
- Expound the debate between realists and intrumentalists (anti-realists). Do you think we _should_ be realists of some sort? Why?
- Can naturalism provide a normative account of how it is that science should be done?
- How might we account for inductive inference in light of grue?
- Are scientific theories incommensurable?
- Should we take the thesis of the Strong Underdetermination of Theories seriously?
- Why have philosopher's of science wanted a theory of verisimilitude? Do _we_ want one? Why? Expound several attempts to develop such a theory and any criticisms of said attempts.
What is the best account of scientific explanation? Why?
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Woodward, J. Scientific Explanation, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
In particular, you might want to think about some (or all if you have the time) of the following models of explanation:
- The deductive-nomological (or covering law) model of explanation (Hempel, C. G. (1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press.)
- The causal relevance model of explanation (Glymour, C. 1982, Causal Inference and Causal Explanation, in What? Where? When? Why? ed. R. McLaughlin, Dordrecht: Reidel, 179-91)
- Explanation by identification (Ruben, D. -H, 1990, Explaining Explanation, London: Routledge)
- Explanation by analogies (Hesse, M. B. 1988, Theories, Family Resemblances and Analogy, in Analogical Reasoning, ed, D. H. Helman, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 317-40)
- Explanation by unification (Salmon, W. C. (1984): Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World Princeton: Princeton University Press.)
- Pragmatic accounts of explanation (Van Fraassen, B. (1980): The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press.)
For a critique of Van Fraassen's (1980) you might want to look at Kitcher, P. and Salmon, W. C. 1987, Van Frasen on Explanation, 'Journal of Philosophy, 84, 315-30.
Van Fraassen's 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press is also especially relevant.
Compare Humean, sufficiency, necessity, and probabilisitic accounts of causation. Which, if any, is best? Why?
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in the following entries:
For the rest:
- Humphrey's, P. (1989): The Chances of Explanation, Princeton University Press.
- Lewis, D. (1983): Causation, in Philosophical Papers vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 159-72.
- Lewis, D. (1983, reprinted 1986): Postscripts to "Causation", in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 172-213.
- Salmon, W. C. (1984): Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press.
What is the best account of Inference to the Best Explanation?
Readings
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Douven, I. Abduction, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
- Harman, G. (1965): The Inference to the best Explanation, Philosophical Review, 74:88-95.
- Lipton, P. (1991): Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge.
- Putnem, H. (1978): Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Hutchinson, 18-22.
- Thagard, P. (1978): The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, Journal of Philosophy, 75:76-92.
- van Fraassen, B. (1980): The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press.
What is the best account of scientific progress? Why?
You might like to think about whether or not the best account should centre on truth, simplicity, coherence, or explanatory power (where these last three don't _necessarily_ imply truth).
You might also want to think about whether your answer is intended to be normative or descriptive.
Readings:
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Niiniluoto, I., Scientific Progress, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
- Popper, K. R. (1963): Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K. R. (1972/9): Objective Knowledge, 1st or 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laudan, L. (1977): Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth, Berkley: University of California Press.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, _2nd_edition_ Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nickles, T. (1980): Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Gutting, G. (1973): Conceptual Structures and Scientific Change, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 4/3, 209-30.
- Newton-Smith, W. H. (1981): The Rationality of Science, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
For a critique of Van Frasen's (1980) you might want to look at Kitcher, P. and Salmon, W. C. 1987, Van Frasen on Explanation, 'Journal of Philosophy, 84, 315-30.
Van Frasen's 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press is also especially relevant.
Expound the debate between realists and intrumentalists (anti-realists). Do you think we _should_ be realists of some sort? Why?
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Chakravartty, A., Scientific Realism, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
- Boyd, R (1984): The Current Status of Scientific Realism. In 'scientific realism', J. Leplin (ed.) (1984), pp. 41-83.
- Fine, A (1986): The Shakey Game: Einstein, Realism, and Quantum Theory, University of Chicago Press.
- Fine, A (1986): Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Instrumentalist Attachments to Science, 'Mind', 95, pp. 149-79.
- Laudan, L (1981): A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science, 48:19-50.
- Leplin, J. (1997): A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism, Oxford University Press.
- Newton-Smith, W (1981): The Rationality of Science, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Putnam, H. (1978): Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Psillos, S. (1999) 'Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth', Routledge
- van-Frassen, B. (1980): The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Worral, J. (1984): An Unreal Image, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35:65-80.
Can naturalism provide a normative account of how it is that science should be done?
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Papineau, D., Naturalism, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
- Giere, R. N. (1988): Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago Press.
- Kitcher, P. (1992): The Naturalists Return, Philosophical Review, 101: 53-114.
- Kornblith, H. (ed.) (1985): Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press.
- Laudan, L. (1987): Progress or Rationality, The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.
- Putnam, H. (1982): Why Reason can't be Naturalized, Synthese, 52: 3-23.
How might we account for inductive inference in light of grue?
Readings
A good overview of the issues can be found in:
- Vickers, J., Naturalism, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
For the rest:
- Armstrong, D. M. (1991): What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue, 30: 503–11.
- Goodman, N. (1954): Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Athlone Press.
- Jeffreys, H. (1961): Theory of Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Norton, J. D. (2006): The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction." Synthese, 150: 185-207.
- Russell, B. (1959): The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
- Stove, D. C. (1986): The Rationality of Induction, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted 2001.
- Popper, K. R. (1959): Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books.
Are scientific theories incommensurable?
Readings
- Churchland, P. M. (1992): A Deeper Unity: Some Feyerarbendian Themes in Neurocomputational form, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 15: Cognitive Models of Science, Ronald Giere (ed.), University of Minnesota Press, 341-63.
- Davidson, D. (1985): On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 183-98.
- Feyerabend, P. K. (1987): Putnam on Incommensurability, in Farewell to Reason, London: Verso, 265-72.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, _2nd_edition_ Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Putnam, H. (1975): Is Semantics Possible?, In Philosophical Papers vol. 2, Mind, Langauge, and Reality, Cambridge University Press, 139-52.
- Thagard, P. (1992): Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press.
Should we take the thesis of the Strong Underdetermination of Theories seriously?
Readings
- Bergstrom, L. (1984): Underdetermination and Realism, Erkenntnis, 21:349-65.
- Boyd, R. (1973): Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence.
- Earman, J. (1993): Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18:19-38.
- Laudan, L. (1990): Demystifying Underdetermination, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 14: 267-97.
- Laudan, L., and Leplin, J. (1991): Empirical Equivalence and Underdeterminism, Journal of Philosophy, 88:449-72.
- Newton-Smith, W. H. (1978): The Underdetermination of Theory by Data, Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 52: 71-91.
- Quine, W. V. O. (1975): On Empirically Equivalent Theories of the World, Ernenntnis, 9:313-28.
- van Fraassen, B. (1980): The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press.
Why have philosopher's of science wanted a theory of verisimilitude? Do _we_ want one? Why? Expound several attempts to develop such a theory and any criticisms of said attempts.
Readings
- Brink, C. & Heidema (1987): 'A verisimilar ordering of theories phrased in a propositional language'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38, 533-49.
- Brink, C., Vermeulen J. C., and Pretorius, J. P. G. (1992): Verisimilitude via Vietoris, Journal for Logic and Computation, 2, 709-18.
- Kuipers, T. A. F. (ed) (1987): What is Closer-to-the-truth. (<---- THIS IS A HANDY ONE with LOADS OF PAPERS) See especially the Van Bentham paper (103-28) and Schurtz, G., & Weingartner, P (47-77).
- Kuipers, T. A. F. (2011): From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism: On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation (Synthese Library).
- Niiniluoto, I. (1987): Truthlikeness.
- Oddie, G. (1986): Likeness to Truth.
- Orlowska, E. (1990): Verisimilitude Based on Concept Analysis.
- Popper, K. (1963): Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge.
- Popper, K. (1972): Objective Knowledge.
- Psillos, S. (1999) 'Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth', Routledge, ch. 11: 'Truth-Likeness'.
Contact details
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